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E-mail address: david.westwood@dal.ca (D.A. WesIn 1992, Goodale and Milner proposed the existence of a dedicated visuomotor control system that allows
for the control of action without the need for conscious perception of the target object’s form. The ‘action
and perception hypothesis’ was motivated in large part by the surprising observation of spared visuomo-
tor abilities in D.F., a patient with a severe deﬁcit in visual form perception attributable to a lesion con-
centrated in the lateral occipital complex of the ventral stream. When D.F. reaches out to grasp an object,
her hand posture in ﬂight reﬂects the size, shape, and orientation of the object, despite the fact that she is
unable to report those same object features. Nevertheless, there are systematic limits to her spared ability
to grasp objects: her performance sharply deteriorates for objects deﬁned by second-order contrast,
objects whose principal axis of orientation is ambiguous, objects removed from view before the onset
of the action, and objects seen without cues to absolute distance. At the same time, a considerable body
of psychophysical evidence from healthy observers has accumulated that is consistent with the idea of a
dedicated visuomotor control system that is independent of perceptual inﬂuence. Although some of this
evidence is controversial, we will argue that, on balance, there is good agreement between the psycho-
physical and neuropsychological data – and that the action and perception hypothesis is still alive and
well.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In 1992, Goodale and Milner proposed that the visual control of
action is distinct from visual perception. Drawing primarily on
evidence from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropsy-
chology, they suggested that this distinction between vision-for-
action and vision-for-perception could be mapped onto the two
prominent visual pathways arising from primary visual cortex: a
dorsal ‘action’ pathway projecting to the posterior parietal cortex
and a ventral ‘perception’ pathway projecting to the inferotempo-
ral cortex. In the almost 20 years since the ﬁrst exposition of what
we will refer to here as the ‘action and perception hypothesis’, a
considerable body of literature has built up around the basic idea
that vision-for-action and vision-for-perception operate with some
degree of independence. In some cases, the new data are consistent
with the original hypothesis, and in other cases the data have chal-
lenged the idea and have led to reﬁnements. Here we will discuss
the speciﬁc issue of whether or not the data obtained from psycho-
physical studies of action and perception in ‘healthy observers’
(i.e., without any neurological, visual, or motor disturbances) are
consistent with the original neuropsychological evidence fromll rights reserved.
twood).the visual form agnosic patient D.F., whose case was so inﬂuential
in the original formulation of the action and perception hypothesis.
In order to place some reasonable boundaries on the scope of this
commentary, we will focus primarily on studies of grasping. We
have chosen this focus because D.F.’s ability to grasp objects despite
a frankdeﬁcit in visual formperceptionwas one of themost compel-
ling observations that led to the formulation of the action and
perception hypothesis. Moreover, the distinction between the pro-
cessing of object features for action and perception distinguishes
Goodale andMilner’s interpretation of the division of labor between
the dorsal and ventral streams from the ideas put forward by
Ungerleider and Mishkin (1981), which focused on differences
between spatial and object vision. We acknowledge that a compre-
hensive review comparing the neuropsychological and psychophys-
ical evidence from a broader range of perceptual and motor tasks
would be useful, but such a review is beyond the scope of this paper.2. D.F.’s grasping behavior
2.1. Action without perception
A number of studies have investigated the grasping abilities of
D.F., a patient with profound visual form agnosia resulting from
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complex of the ventral visual stream (James, Culham, Humphrey,
Milner, & Goodale, 2003). When she posted a wooden card into a
series of slots placed a different orientations (Goodale, Milner,
Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner et al., 1991), D.F. rotated her hand
to the orientation of the slot very early in the movement – well be-
fore she could have used visual or tactile feedback to monitor the
accuracy of her action. This observation was particularly striking
because D.F. could not report the orientation of the slot verbally
or even manually (by adjusting the orientation of her hand or the
hand-held card to match the orientation of the slot without posting
it), a result that suggests that she could not perceive the slot’s ori-
entation at a conscious perceptual level. This ﬁnding provided the
motivation for a broad exploration of her preserved visuomotor
abilities. In one of the early studies, Goodale and colleagues
(1991) showed that D.F.’s grip aperture in ﬂight (i.e., the separation
between her index ﬁnger and thumb) reﬂected the width of rectan-
gular objects when she reached to grasp them, even though she
could not report the objects’ widths by opening her index ﬁnger
and thumb a matching amount, a kind of magnitude estimation
of their widths. The shapes used in the study were Efron (1969)
blocks, which have a negative correlation between length and
width, ensuring that all the blocks in the stimulus set have the
same surface areas and thus the same amount of reﬂected light;
therefore, D.F.’s ability to scale her grasp to the width of the target
object could not be explained by a simple servomechanism linking
grip size and the total luminance coming from the object’s surface.
In a subsequent paper, Goodale et al. (1994) showed that D.F. chose
appropriate grasping postures when she picked up irregularly
shaped objects. That is to say, that the opposition axis formed by
the vector between the contact points for her index ﬁnger and
thumb tended to pass through the object’s center of mass, which
is necessary to prevent the object from rotating out of the grasp
during lifting and manipulation. Moreover, the initial points of
contact for her ﬁnger and thumb also tended to coincide with
points of maximum convexity, a strategy that minimizes the like-
lihood that the digits will slip from the object’s surface. D.F.’s per-
formance in this grasping task implies that her intact visuomotor
system can process the entire form of the target object and not just
the locations of high-contrast edges.
The studies cited thus far would appear to suggest that D.F.’s
visuomotor abilities are perfectly preserved, but this is not the
case. Goodale and colleagues (1994) conducted a series of experi-
ments designed to probe the limits of D.F.’s visually guided abilities
to match the orientation of her hand to the orientation of a target
stimulus deﬁned by different features. They ﬁrst did this by vary-
ing the type of visual information that was used to deﬁne the tar-
get in relation to the background. In these experiments, D.F. was
required to reach out with a handheld rectangular card and ‘stamp’
its inked edge onto an oriented bar presented on a sheet of paper
so that the edge of the card was aligned with the principal axis
of the stimulus. The data from these studies showed that D.F. could
perform well only when the target stimulus was deﬁned by ﬁrst-
order contrast (i.e., edges deﬁned by luminance contrast). For
example, her performance deteriorated when the target was de-
ﬁned by a difference in the textural elements from its background
or by a vernier offset, suggesting that the ‘stripped-down’ visuo-
motor system, i.e. one working without input from an intact per-
ceptual network works, relies largely on luminance-deﬁned
edges. In another test, D.F. was asked to post a T-shaped object into
a T-shaped slot. Interestingly, in this case, the ﬁnal position that
D.F. adopted with the stem of the T-shaped object was aligned with
one of the two principal axes of the T-shaped slot. In other words,
she either succeeded in putting the T-shaped card into the slot, or
she completely failed, choosing a position that was orthogonal to
the correct orientation. This suggests that her visuomotor systemwas capable of processing only one axis of elongation at a time –
and that the task of matching one pattern with another, a require-
ment for successful insertion of a T-shaped card into a T-shaped
slot, requires an intact perceptual system. It is useful to point out
that this conclusion does not contradict the observation noted ear-
lier that D.F.’s actions can take into consideration the entire shape
of a target object, as in the case of grasping the irregular shaped
objects in Goodale et al. (1994). D.F.’s difﬁculty with the T-shaped
object matching task emerges not because she is unable to process
the entire shape of the T-shaped target slot, but because she is
required to compare (and ultimately align) the shapes of two
different objects.
2.2. Memory-linked impairments in action
Most actions are directed at visible objects, but sometimes we
work ‘off-line’, responding to objects that are no longer in view
or mimicking a target-directed action but in another part of the
workspace. Goodale, Jakobson, and Keillor (1994) compared D.F.’s
ability to reach out and grasp objects in a natural condition, in
which the target objects were visible, with her ability to panto-
mime those actions after the target had been removed from view
for 2 s. They also looked at actions made to a location displaced
from the actual position of the target, another kind of pantomimed
grasp. D.F. was able to scale her peak grip aperture to the width of
the target stimuli only in the natural condition. Indeed, the shape
of D.F.’s grip aperture proﬁle across the entire action was qualita-
tively different for the natural condition as compared to the de-
layed or displaced pantomimed conditions, in which her grip
scaling was either very poor or entirely absent. On the basis of
these results, Goodale et al. (1994) proposed that D.F.’s visuomotor
system can operate only in ‘real time’, and only when the action is
directed towards the target object. When memory for the target
object is required to guide her action or when an action is directed
towards a displaced location, D.F.’s performance collapses, imply-
ing that a representation of the target object derived from percep-
tual processing is required to guide action in these unusual
circumstances.
2.3. Monocular impairments in action
Dijkerman, Milner, and Carey (1996) studied D.F.’s ability to
grasp ﬂat objects that were rotated within the depth plane, and
found that her posture of her ﬁngers in ﬂight reﬂected the orienta-
tion of the object when she carried out her movement with binoc-
ular vision, but her performance deteriorated when one eye was
covered. Similar decrements in performance under monocular
viewing were not observed in the control participants, which sug-
gest that D.F.’s preserved visuomotor abilities depend critically on
the availability of binocular visual information about the target ob-
ject. Presumably, the good performance of the control participants
in the monocular grasping task can be attributed to a contribution
from form perception, which is damaged in D.F. This idea seems
plausible because the square objects used in the study would have
cast quite different trapezoidal images on the retina depending on
their orientation in depth. Dijkerman et al. argued that this obser-
vation is consistent with neurophysiological studies that show a
number of areas in the dorsal stream have a preponderance of neu-
rons with binocular receptive ﬁelds. In other words, the dedicated
visuomotor modules that reside in the dorsal stream might require
binocular cues about object form and distance to carry out their
computations (Sakata et al., 1999). Building upon these ideas in a
follow-up study, Dijkerman, Milner, and Carey (1999) found that
D.F.’s ability to grasp objects rotated in the depth plane was
improved in monocular conditions when she was allowed to move
her head from side to side, which presumably allowed her
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ful source of information about absolute distance. This suggests
that the visuomotor systems in D.F.’s intact dorsal stream can
make use of either binocular or retinal-motion cues about the
absolute distance of the target object, but not pictorial cues based
on form. In a related study, Marotta, Behrmann, and Goodale
(1997) explored the role of binocular vision in the grasping abilities
in D.F. and another patient with visual form agnosia, focusing on
the scaling of grip aperture to the size of the target object pre-
sented at various viewing distances. Both patients calibrated their
grasp to the size of the target object regardless of distance in the
binocular conditions, but showed impairments in the monocular
condition, failing to calibrate image size for viewing distance. Ta-
ken together, these ﬁndings further support the notion that abso-
lute distance information is critical to the ability of the
visuomotor system in the dorsal stream to guide action – and that
basic optical cues such as binocular vision and self-generated mo-
tion cues play a central role in the underlying computations.
To summarize, studies of D.F.’s grasping abilities suggest the
existence of a visuomotor system – presumably located in the
dorsal visual stream – that is capable of guiding grasping actions
but neither requires nor generates conscious perceptual aware-
ness of the target object’s form. This specialized system is able
to operate within a limited range of circumstances in which the
target: (1) is separated from the background by luminance–con-
trast edges, (2) is visible, (3) is viewed in conditions that provide
absolute distance cues, and (4) is the direct target of the action.
Given the conditions in which humans tend to operate, one
would suspect that these constraints would rarely come into play.
Nevertheless, control participants remain able to produce rela-
tively accurate grasping movements in conditions like these, con-
ditions that produce devastating effects on D.F.’s performance.
From this, we conclude that in these cases the control of action
may depend on the visual systems that support conscious object
perception – the systems located in the ventral visual stream that
are at the center of D.F.’s lesion and at the root of her visual form
agnosia.3. Data from psychophysical studies of action and perception
3.1. What could psychophysics contribute to the action and perception
hypothesis?
It is obvious that patient D.F. is a special case – although a num-
ber of other similar cases with similar dissociations have occasion-
ally been reported both in the older literature (e.g., Campion, 1987)
and more recently (e.g., Karnath, Rüter, Mandler, & Himmelbach,
2009). Nevertheless, if the ideas that derive from analyses of her
perceptual and visuomotor abilities in any way reﬂect the general
functional architecture of the human brain, it might be possible to
demonstrate patterns of performance in healthy observers that are
consistent with the existence of a specialized visuomotor control
system that can operate separately from conscious form percep-
tion. It is not a foregone conclusion that such demonstrations will
be possible, given the extensive connections that exist between the
visual areas of the dorsal and ventral visual streams (for review,
see Milner & Goodale, 2006). Indeed, it would be extraordinary if
the control of action were completely divorced from conscious vi-
sual perception. For the same reason, the failure to demonstrate a
clear distinction between action and perception in a particular task
or situation can never be taken as strong evidence against the ac-
tion and perception hypothesis. By saying this, we do not mean
to imply that the action and perception hypothesis is irrefutable.
But it is important to point out that studies that fail to ﬁnd a differ-
ence between action and perception are difﬁcult to interpret for allthe same reasons that make it difﬁcult to argue in favor of a statis-
tical null hypothesis. In a similar vein, viable alternatives to the ac-
tion and perception hypothesis would have to account for the
results of not only one study or experiment, but also the neuropsy-
chological data discussed earlier (as well as a host of neuroimaging
and neurophysiological studies); in other words, one cannot sim-
ply claim that action and perception are guided by a common rep-
resentation of the visual world since the data from patient D.F.
(and other neurological cases) have already disconﬁrmed that pos-
sibility. If we are to advance farther in this ﬁeld, it is critical that
testable alternative hypotheses be presented as part of any study
reporting data that are incompatible with the action and percep-
tion hypothesis.
Since the initial formulation of Goodale and Milner’s (1992)
hypothesis there have been a number of psychophysical studies
in healthy observers whose results appear broadly consistent with
the basic tenets of the action–perception distinction. Some of these
studies have been carefully scrutinized and challenged on a variety
of grounds ranging from methodology to interpretation. Our goal
here is not to take a defensive posture about the studies in ques-
tion, but rather to offer some reﬂection and counterpoint to the
criticisms that have been raised, while acknowledging that certain
ﬁndings might not be as compelling as once thought. Indeed, some
important lessons have been learned along the way about the need
to use careful psychophysical approaches when studying the rela-
tion between action and perception in healthy observers. Despite
these words of caution, we remain convinced that there is good
evidence from the psychophysical literature to support the idea
that the visual control of action can operate independently from
conscious visual perception, and that the conditions under which
this independence is observed tend to mirror the conditions under
which D.F.’s visuomotor abilities deteriorate. For reasons outlined
earlier, we will attempt to restrict our discussion to those studies
of grasping that speak most directly to the action and perception
hypothesis.
3.2. Is there dissociation between action and perception for visual
illusions?
In their seminal study, Aglioti, DeSouza, and Goodale (1995) re-
ported that an Ebbinghaus size–contrast illusion did not produce a
signiﬁcant effect on the preshaping of grip aperture despite the fact
that the illusion led participants to reliably misjudge the sizes of
the target objects in the display. This surprising ﬁnding was fol-
lowed up by Haffenden and Goodale (1998) in a study that ad-
dressed some methodological concerns with the original Aglioti
et al. paper. Taken together, these studies appeared to provide evi-
dence in favor of the independence of action and perception in the
intact nervous system, consistent with the action and perception
hypothesis.
Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bulthoff, and Fahle (2000) replicated some
of the effects reported by Aglioti et al. (1995) but argued that the
larger effect of the Ebbinghaus illusion on perception compared
to action could be attributed to the fact that size judgments in-
volved a comparison of two objects presented inside different con-
ﬁgurations of the illusion, whereas grasping movements were
directed toward a single object inside a single illusion conﬁgura-
tion. After correcting this confound, Franz et al. reported that the
effects of the illusion on action and perception were basically
equivalent; similar results have been reported by Pavani, Boscagli,
Benvenuti, Rabuffetti, and Farne (1999) and Vishton, Rea, Cutting,
and Nunez (1999). The single- versus dual-illusion argument could
not account for the effects of the illusion on grasping and manual
size estimation reported in Haffenden and Goodale (1998)’s study,
but Franz et al. suggested that the ‘non-conventional’ manual
estimation procedure used to gauge the perceptual effects of the
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much larger perceptual illusion than has been reported using more
conventional psychophysical techniques.
Franz (2003) went on to compare manual size estimation and a
traditional psychophysical technique (i.e., the method of adjust-
ment), conﬁrming that the effect of the Ebbinghaus pictorial illu-
sion is much larger for manual size estimation. Moreover, Franz
found that manual size estimation showed a larger response to
changes in the veridical size of the target stimulus than either
the method of adjustment or the peak grip aperture of grasping.
It is worth mentioning that not all studies show different size-
scaling functions for grasping andmanual size estimation: whereas
the data presented in Haffenden and Goodale’s (1998) Fig. 5 (C and
D; small and large objects shown against a blank background) ap-
pear to show a slightly larger size-scaling function for manual esti-
mation as compared to maximum grip aperture, the data from
Ganel, Chajut, and Algom (2008) and Westwood, Danckert, Servos,
and Goodale (2002) show relatively similar size-scaling functions
for grasping and manual size estimation (see Fig. 1). Franz argued
that the difference in the underlying size-scaling functions for
various response types must be considered when comparing the
effects of illusions, and he recommended correcting the absolute
effect of the illusion measured for a particular response by dividing
it by the slope of the size-scaling function for that response. When
this correction is done, Franz showed that the effect of the Ebbing-
haus illusion reported by Haffenden and Goodale (1998) is virtu-
ally identical for grasping and manual size estimation (see also
Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008).
Franz’s analyses and interpretation could be particularly chal-
lenging for the relevance of the action and perception model to
the behavior of healthy observers, given that the visual illusion
paradigm has been held up as a bridge that crosses the gap be-
tween neuropsychology and psychophysics. Without diminishing
the importance of Franz’s work, which is substantial, we would like
to point out a few issues that require further consideration before
concluding that visual illusions produce equivalent effects on ac-
tion and perception.
Franz’s conclusions depend heavily on the claim that it is neces-
sary to correct the effect of a visual illusion measured in a particu-
lar type of response (e.g., peak grip aperture in grasping) by
normalizing it to the size-scaling function for that response type.
This correction is likened to the standard scientiﬁc laboratory pro-
cedure of instrument calibration, in the sense that a signal ob-
served in a response (i.e., an absolute effect of an illusion) cannot
be interpreted without knowing the sensitivity of the response to
a standard set of inputs (i.e., a true change in the size of the object).0






















Fig. 1. The effect of object size on peak grip aperture, explicit manual estimates,
and adjustment of a comparison stimulus (on a computer screen) extracted from
the experiment on Weber’s law carried out by Ganel et al. (2008). Note that the
slopes of these three functions are remarkably similar. Indeed, there is virtually no
difference in slope between grip aperture and manual estimates. Error bars reﬂect
the standard error between subjects, and are unrelated to the within-subject
variance used to calculate Weber fractions. Data kindly provided by Ganel.Although this logic seems appealing, it is not beyond challenge. In
fact, the instrument calibration analogy is useful for illustrating our
point. Instruments detect a speciﬁc type of signal (e.g., intensity of
light) and generate an output response (e.g., a digital output).
There is a non-arbitrary relationship between the input and output
signals that can be mapped by regressing the instrument’s output
responses against a set of known input signals. After calibration, it
becomes possible to interpret the instrument’s response when an
unknown signal of the same type (i.e., light intensity) is fed into
the system. The instrument calibration analogy breaks down when
considering the issue of absolute illusion effects and size-scaling
functions, however, because there is a imperfect relationship be-
tween the standard signal used to generate the calibration curve
(veridical object size) and the signal that is later fed into the sys-
tem (the effects on object size – or not – of the contextual elements
of the particular illusion). Although one could argue that illusions
operate on an internal representation of object size, and can there-
fore be considered as an equivalent signal to the veridical size of
the object, we suggest that this assumption is ﬂawed in at least
one regard.
Most pictorial illusions employ contextual features that convey
a sense of depth or distance, such that their effects on size percep-
tion are typically attributed to inappropriate size-constancy mech-
anisms (Gregory, 1997). If this is correct, then one could argue that
the effect of a pictorial illusion on judgments of object size is med-
iated by quite a different mechanism (i.e., inappropriate size-con-
stancy scaling) than the effect of a veridical change in the size of
the target object on judgments of object size (i.e., increasing the
size of the object’s retinal image). Because each mechanism could
affect the response via a different scaling function, it might not be
appropriate to ‘calibrate’ one effect (the illusion) based on the scal-
ing function for another effect (veridical size). The rationale for the
size-scaling correction is even less compelling for responses like
peak grip aperture in grasping because it is well established that
peak grip aperture is affected by many factors other than the verid-
ical size of the target object; for example, peak grip aperture can be
affected by eliminating visual feedback (Franz, Hesse, & Kollath,
2009), switching from binocular to monocular viewing (Servos,
Goodale, & Jakobson, 1992), or placing obstacles in the path of
the grasping movement (Tresilian, 1998). Thus, it is unclear that
knowledge of the relationship between true object size and peak
grip aperture is of any value in interpreting, let alone correcting,
any of the other effects that can be detected for grasping move-
ments. Before scientists in this ﬁeld move to adopt the correction
procedure recommended by Franz, we propose that one ought to
ﬁrst provide some compelling evidence that the effect of the illu-
sion in question is mediated by the same mechanism responsible
for the effect of a change in veridical target size. Of course, this
would be necessary for any of the response types (i.e., peak grip
aperture in grasping, manual size estimation, and other conven-
tional measures of size perception) for which the correction proce-
dure is recommended. One way to do this would be to demonstrate
a strong, positive, within-subjects correlation between the effect of
a particular illusion and the effect of a parametric variation in the
size of the target object. Such a correlation would provide some
reassurance that the two effects are mediated by a common mech-
anism, and that it might be appropriate or even necessary to cor-
rect the measured effects of illusions in the calibration-like way
advocated by Franz.
In our opinion, it is premature and possibly even inappropriate
to use the illusion correction procedure recommended by Franz
(2003), although we appreciate that some type of correction may
be necessary to account for potential differences between re-
sponses in their sensitivity to sources of information that are rele-
vant to the effect of the illusion. A more appropriate way to do this
might be to ‘calibrate’ the effect of an illusion using the sensitivity
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the illusion itself. For example, one could assess the sensitivity of
grasping, manual size estimation, or some other more conventional
measure of size perception, to a parametric variation in the sizes of
the circles in the annular rings of the Ebbinghaus illusion, the angle
or length of the ﬁns that form the ends of the Muller-Lyer illusion,
or perhaps even the luminance contrast of the illusion’s inducing
elements.
Even if one accepts the logic of the illusion correction procedure
recommended by Franz (2003), there are several studies whose
ﬁndings cannot be explained by differences in the size-scaling
functions for action and perception. One particularly compelling
example is the study of Ganel, Tanzer, and Goodale (2008) who
constructed a stimulus display in which two objects with different
sizes were displayed within a Ponzo-type ﬁgure that created the
perceptual illusion that the small object was actually larger than
the large object. This creates an interesting scenario in which the
veridical sizes of the objects are exactly opposite to their perceived
sizes. [A similar approach was used by Grandy and Westwood
(2006) to explore the effect of a size-weight illusion on heaviness
judgments and lifting dynamics.] Consistent with the action and
perception hypothesis, Ganel, Tanzer et al. (2008) found that peak
grip aperture was scaled to the veridical sizes of the target objects,
whereas perceptual judgments of object size reﬂected the illusory
sizes of the target objects; in other words, the direction of differ-
ence between the two target stimuli was opposite for action and
perception. Whether or not there are different underlying size-
scaling functions for grasping and perceptual judgment, the con-
clusions of this study would not change since an illusion correction
procedure could not reverse the sign of the observed differences;
presumably, both action and perception would show a positive
size-scaling function.3.3. Beyond illusions: different psychophysical principles for action and
perception
Beyond the illusion paradigm, Ganel, Chajut, and Algom (2008)
have demonstrated a fundamental difference between the psycho-
physical laws that govern grasping and size perception, which sug-
gests that the two functions are distinct. According to the results of
this study, grasping movements do not conform to Weber’s law in
the sense that the sensitivity of grip aperture to changes in the size
of the target object is stable across a range of object sizes.1 Of
course, perceptual judgments of object size readily conform to We-
ber’s law, such that the sensitivity to changes in object size was
proportional to the overall size of the target object. In a similar
vein, Ganel and Goodale (2003) showed that speed with which per-
ceptual judgments of object shape were made were affected by the
requirement to ﬁlter an irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g., the
width of the object, when the task was to respond only the length),
whereas no such slowing occurred when the task was to grasp the
target object. This observation further supports the idea that the
visual control of grasping is guided by fundamentally different1 Of course, this ﬁnding (as well as the fact actions are often resistant to size-
contrast illusions) ﬁts well with the ‘double-pointing’ hypothesis of Smeets and
Brenner’s (1999), Smeets and Brenner’s (2001). According to their account, the
visuomotor system does not compute the size of the target object but instead
computes the two locations on the surface of object where the digits will be placed.
Thus, size is irrelevant to the planning of these trajectories, and variation in size will
not affect the accuracy with which the ﬁnger and thumb are placed on either side the
object. In short, Weber’s law is essentially irrelevant (Smeets & Brenner, 2008). The
same argument applies to grasping movements made in the context of size-contrast
illusions: because grip scaling is simply an epiphenomenon of the independent ﬁnger
trajectories, grip aperture seems to be impervious to the effects of the illusion. Their
view, of course is completely antithetical to Franz’s claim that grasping is sensitive to
the perceived size of target objects.psychophysical principles than the visual perception of object
features, consistent with the basic idea behind the action and per-
ception hypothesis.
3.4. Memory-linked changes for action
Earlier we discussed evidence showing that D.F.’s good visuo-
motor abilities deteriorate when the target object is removed from
view prior to the action. Control participants can grasp remem-
bered objects with relative ease, which implies that the control
of action depends upon the form perception system when memory
is required. There is now considerable support from the psycho-
physical literature for the idea that visually guided and memory-
guided actions are distinct, and that perceptual representations
of the target object are required for the latter but not the former.
Westwood and colleagues conducted a series of studies on visu-
ally guided and memory-guided grasping with the Muller-Lyer
(ML) pictorial illusion, motivated by the dramatic difference in
D.F.’s grasping abilities in such conditions. Westwood, Chapman,
and Roy (2000) showed that peak grip aperture in natural grasping,
in which vision of the target display was available before and dur-
ing the action, was unaffected by the conﬁguration of the sur-
rounding ML illusion, whereas a robust effect of the illusion was
seen in pantomimed grasping, where the target and display were
physically removed 2 s before the response. The magnitude of
the illusion effect was identical for manual size estimation in the
two visual conditions. This observation is consistent with the
dramatic deterioration of D.F.’s grasping abilities in pantomimed
compared to natural conditions, suggesting that perceptual repre-
sentations are required for the control of pantomimed actions.
However, follow-up studies by Westwood, Heath, and Roy (2000)
and Westwood, McEachern, and Roy (2001) found that the in-
creased effect of the ML illusion in conditions that required mem-
ory for the target were more likely due to the confounding effect of
eliminating on-line visual feedback in the memory-dependent con-
ditions compared to the visually guided condition; in other words,
the effect of the illusion was present for pure open-loop grasping
movements, in which vision was removed at the onset of the ac-
tion, and did not increase further when vision was removed at
the time of response cueing, or 3 s prior to response cueing. This
ﬁnding was replicated and extended recently by Franz and col-
leagues (2009). Westwood and colleagues (2001) argued that on-
line visual feedback might be necessary for the visuomotor system
to resist the ‘non-illusory’ effects of the ML stimulus, by which they
meant the potential for the ﬁns of the stimulus to be construed as
potential obstacles to the placement of the ﬁngers on the ends of
the target object. Interestingly, a study by Heath, Rival, and Neely
(2006) showed that the increase in effect of the ML ﬁgure in open-
loop as compared to closed-loop grasping disappears when the two
visual conditions are mixed in random compared to blocked order;
in the random mixing condition, the effect of the ML stimulus in-
creased for the closed-loop trials and came to match that seen in
open-loop trials. This ﬁnding suggests that participant strategies
can inﬂuence the effect of this particular stimulus on grasping
behavior (for a discussion of this issue, see Whitwell & Goodale,
2009; Whitwell, Lambert, & Goodale, 2008), although the same
may not be true for other types of illusion-inducing stimuli as dis-
cussed below. As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, an alterna-
tive interpretation of Heath et al.’s (2006) results is that the
visuomotor system may be able to adapt to the errors induced by
the ML ﬁgure in closed-loop trials when these are done in blocked
order because visual feedback is available for a series of consecu-
tive trials; the same may not possible in randomly intermixed
open-loop and closed-loop trials. In any case, if participant strate-
gies can indeed alter the effect of an illusion-inducing stimulus on
a particular response, this challenges the logic of correcting abso-
2 The fact that Weber’s law is obeyed in delayed grasping cannot be easily
explained by Smeets and Brenner’s (1999), Smeets and Brenner’s (2001) double-
pointing model without conceding that – with delay – grip scaling is no longer a
consequence of programming individual digit trajectories, but instead reﬂects the
perceived size of the target object. Nor can it explain the fact that grip aperture is
sensitive to relative size differences in delay (Hu & Goodale, 2000; Westwood &
Goodale, 2003) without making a similar concession. It should be noted that even if
Smeets and Brenner’s model of grasping is correct, this would not obviate the idea of
separate visual pathways for perception and action. It could be the case that real-time
grasping, which is mediated by the dorsal stream, uses independent digit control
whereas delayed grasping, which is mediated by the ventral stream, uses object size.
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response since this procedure assumes that any change in the re-
sponse occurs because of a change in an underlying representation
of size. From the point of view of the Westwood and colleagues’
(2001) arguments, the increased effect of the ML stimulus in Heath
et al.’s randomly mixed closed- and open-loop trials is presumably
due to a change in participant strategy (perhaps in dealing with the
ﬁns as obstacles) rather than a change in the underlying represen-
tation of the object’s size or the perceptual illusion itself. This poses
some real difﬁculty for Franz’s correction procedure.
Hu and Goodale (2000) studied the effect of a relative-size illu-
sion on peak grip aperture and manual size estimation in real time
open-loop and 5-s delay conditions, ensuring that on-line was not
available in either condition. The study showed no effect of the sin-
gle ﬂanking object on grasping in the open-loop condition, but a
larger and signiﬁcant effect in the 5-s delay condition. Manual size
estimation was signiﬁcantly affected by the ﬂanker’s size in both
conditions. This study provides support for a memory-linked tran-
sition from a mode of control for grasping that is independent of a
perceptual illusion to one that is dependent upon the illusion, con-
sistent with the speculation derived from Goodale and colleague’s
(1994) study with D.F. It is worthwhile to note that Franz and
Gegenfurtner (2008) have challenged the statistical analysis used
by Hu and Goodale (2000) and carried out their own calculations
based on the published data. According to their own calculations,
Franz and Gegenfurtner conclude that the effects of the ﬂanking
object on grasping for the open-loop and 5-s delay conditions are
not signiﬁcantly different when the two conditions are compared
to each other directly; however, this is not particularly surprising
given the relatively low statistical power of the original dataset
to detect such an interaction.
In an extension of Hu and Goodale’s (2000) basic paradigm,
Westwood and Goodale (2003) introduced some methodological
changes that included randomly interleaving open-loop and mem-
ory-guided trials to equate the attentional demands and partici-
pant strategies of the two visual conditions. The study included a
very short (i.e., visual occlusion at the time of response cueing)
and a longer memory condition (i.e., visual occlusion 3 s prior to
response cueing). Like in Hu and Goodale’s study, a single-ﬂanker
relative-size illusion was used to study the inﬂuence of perceived
object size on the control of grasping. The results (Fig. 2) showed
a signiﬁcantly greater effect of the ﬂanker in the short-delay condi-
tion compared to the open-loop condition, even though the only
difference between the two types of trials was that vision was oc-
cluded at movement onset in the open-loop trials (enabling partic-
ipants to use vision to program the movement) but at the time of
response cueing in the short-delay trials (forcing participants to
rely on a memory of the target that had been in view only a mo-
ment before). Importantly, the magnitude of the ﬂanker’s effect
did not increase in the 3-s delay condition compared to the
short-delay condition. Given the brevity of the brief delay period,
we proposed that a very rapid transition in movement control oc-
curs when the target is removed from view, from a mode of control
that does not require form perception to one that does. This led us
to suggest that the visually guided mode of control, which is not
inﬂuenced by the perceptual system, operates in real time; that
is, it does not begin the transformation of visual information from
the target into a motor program until the time the action is re-
quired. If the target is not visible when the action is required, the
motor control system accesses a stored perceptual representation
of the target object that presumably was initially processed by
form perception mechanisms in the ventral stream.
Moving away from visual illusions, two of the studies cited ear-
lier by Ganel and colleagues (2008) and Ganel and Goodale (2003),
included visually guided and memory-guided grasping conditions.
In Ganel, Chajut et al. (2008), visually guided grasping violatedWe-ber’s law, but memory-guided grasping did not.2 In the Ganel and
Goodale (2003) study, visually guided grasping was not affected by
the need to ﬁlter an irrelevant stimulus dimension, but memory-
guided grasping was. In a study of visuomotor priming, in which
congruent or incongruent target objects were seen before respond-
ing to a visible or a remembered target object, Cant, Westwood, Val-
year, and Goodale (2005) found no evidence of priming for visually
guided grasping movements but signiﬁcant effects for memory-
guided grasping. Hesse, de Grave, Franz, Brenner, and Smeets
(2008) carried out a somewhat similar study but report results sug-
gesting that priming can occur in visually guided grasping; however,
this study did not include a memory-guided grasping condition, so it
is not clear whether the reported effect of priming would be larger in
such a condition. Consistent with the evidence from the relative-size
illusion studies discussed earlier, these studies provide some support
for the role of perceptual information in the control of memory-
guided but not visually guided grasping.
Overall, there appears to be considerable agreement between
the psychophysical and neuropsychological literatures about the
role of perceptual information in the control of memory-guided
but not visually guided grasping. There remains some concern that
several studies of memory-guided grasping did not include appro-
priate open-loop conditions for comparison, but concerns about
the role of on-line visual feedback in the memory-linked effects
on action do not apply to many of the key studies cited above.
Interestingly, strong data showing that D.F. is able to grasp objects
without on-line visual control are not available. There are anec-
dotal reports that D.F.’s grasping abilities are not impaired when
vision is removed at movement onset, and there is some evidence
to this effect in a paper by Schenk andMilner (2006). Moreover, the
original studies of D.F.’s visuomotor posting abilities (Milner et al.,
1991) showed evidence of very early scaling of grasping to the ori-
entation of the target slot (300 ms into the action, which was the
earliest time point reported), which decreases the likelihood that
her motor performance can be attributed wholly to on-line visual
guidance.3.5. Monocular-linked changes for action
In contrast to the robust evidence in favor of a role for percep-
tion in the control of memory-guided action, which mirrors the
neuropsychological evidence from patient D.F., there are surpris-
ingly few studies showing the same for monocular grasping, even
though this visual manipulation has a substantial negative effect
on D.F.’s grasping performance as discussed earlier. Certainly a
large number of studies have shown that grasping performance
is less accurate and more variable in monocular as compared to
binocular conditions (e.g., Bradshaw & Elliott, 2003; Bradshaw
et al., 2004; Melmoth & Grant, 2006; Servos & Goodale, 1994; Ser-
vos et al., 1992; Watt & Bradshaw, 2003), but these studies did not
directly address the possibility that this difference is speciﬁcally
related to an increased role for perception in the monocular
conditions.
Marotta, DeSouza, Haffenden, and Goodale (1998) explored the







































Fig. 2. Effect of relative ﬂanker size (small, same, large) on the scaling of peak grip aperture on vision and occlusion trials for no-delay and delay groups. In the no-delay
group, all participants had a 500-ms view of the target object and ﬂanker at the beginning of a trial before the auditory cue to grasp the object was presented. Vision of the
target was available between movement cueing and movement onset for the vision trials, whereas vision was occluded between movement cueing and movement onset for
the occlusion trials. For the delay group, all participants were given a 500-ms preview followed by a 3-s period with no vision. On vision trials, vision was re-introduced when
the cue to grasp was presented and was removed when the movement began. On occlusion trials, vision remained unavailable for the rest of the trial. Vision and occlusion
trials were randomly interleaved for both the no-delay and the delay groups. Although the presence of ﬂankers of different sizes did not affect peak grip aperture on vision
trials for either the no-delay or the delay group, it did affect grip aperture on occlusion trials. Thus, on occlusion trials, grip aperture was larger when the target object was
accompanied by a smaller ﬂanker and was smaller when the target object was accompanied by a larger ﬂanker. Inset: peak grip aperture difference scores for small ﬂanker
trials minus large ﬂanker trials. Reprinted with permission from Westwood and Goodale (2003).
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effect was greater in the monocular condition. This observation
was true only for a condition in which the height of the stimulus
array in the visual scene was varied on a trial by trial basis, which
prevents participants from using vertical gaze angle (a monocular
cue to object distance) to help calibrate their grasping actions.
Although this ﬁnding is consistent with the data from D.F., a re-
lated study by Otto-de Haart, Carey, and Milne (1999) using the
ML illusion found equivalent, signiﬁcant effects for monocular
and binocular grasping. These authors did not vary the distance
of the target stimulus across trials, so it is possible that binocular
vision was not needed to properly calibrate the grasping actions
in the experiment. This would mean that grasping in both condi-
tions ought to show signiﬁcant effects of the illusion, given that
other studies tend to ﬁnd small but signiﬁcant effects of the ML
illusion on grasping in binocular conditions (e.g., Franz et al.,
2009; Westwood et al., 2001). It seems that further studies on this
topic are warranted.4. Conclusions
Goodale and Milner’s (1992) proposal that there is a dedicated
system for the control of visually guided action that neither
depends upon, nor produces, conscious form perception has gener-
ated a tremendous amount of research. The action and perception
hypothesis was driven in large part by surprising observations
from a speciﬁc individual, D.F., who had a rather rare lesion that
was concentrated largely within the lateral occipital complex in
the ventral visual stream. D.F.’s case provided an opportunity to
study the capacity for control of action in the absence of conscious
perception of object form. Data from a number of studies with D.F.
suggested that the visuomotor networks that underlie her residual
capacity for action have clear constraints. These networks ap-
peared to break down when: (1) the target object was deﬁned by
second-order contrast (i.e., not by luminance contrast), (2) theprimary axis of the target object was ambiguous (i.e., multiple sali-
ent cues to orientation were included), (3) the object was removed
from view prior to the action, and (4) visual cues to absolute dis-
tance were unavailable (i.e., in monocular viewing, without head
movements). Psychophysical studies of ‘healthy observers’ have
produced some results that are consistent with D.F.’s visuomotor
performance constraints. The studies that have used pictorial illu-
sions have generated considerable controversy, but we have some
outstanding concerns with the methodological criticisms raised by
those who claim the effects of illusions on action and perception
are equivalent. Nevertheless, as discussed above, there are several
reports that show dissociations between action and perception
that do not employ visual illusions and that are therefore immune
to the controversies that exist in that domain. There is broad sup-
port from psychophysical studies for the notion that conscious
form perception is required for the control of memory-guided
but not visually guided grasping, and some limited evidence sug-
gesting that perception is required more for monocular than binoc-
ular grasping. To reiterate the conclusion foreshadowed in the title
of this article, we believe that the neuropsychological and psycho-
physical data converge in support of Goodale and Milner’s (1992)
action and perception hypothesis.References
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